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Abstract: Smart home devices are vulnerable to passive
inference attacks based on network traffic, even in the
presence of encryption. In this paper, we present Ping-
Pong, a tool that can automatically extract packet-
level signatures (i.e., simple sequences of packet lengths
and directions) from the network traffic of smart home
devices, and use those signatures to detect occur-
rences of specific device events (e.g., light bulb turning
ON/OFF). We evaluated PingPong on popular smart
home devices ranging from smart plugs to thermostats
and home security systems. We have successfully: (1)
extracted packet-level signatures from 18 devices (11
of which are the most popular smart home devices on
Amazon) from 15 popular vendors, (2) used those sig-
natures to detect occurrences of specific device events
with an average recall of more than 97%, and (3) shown
that the signatures are unique among tens of millions of
packets of real world network traffic.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), smart home, net-
work traffic signatures, security and privacy
1 Introduction
Modern smart home devices are seeing widespread
adoption. Smart home devices typically connect to the
Internet via the home Wi-Fi router, and are controlled
directly, or using a smartphone or voice assistant. Al-
though most modern smart home devices encrypt their
network traffic, recent work has demonstrated that the
smart home is susceptible to passive inference attacks,
where an eavesdropper may use the characteristics of
the network traffic generated by smart home devices
to infer the type of device and device activity [1, 8–
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12, 25, 34, 35]. However, these passive inference tech-
niques still have limitations. Most can only identify
the device type and whether there is device activity,
but not the exact type of activity or command [8–
11, 25, 34, 35]. Others only apply to a limited num-
ber of devices from a specific vendor [12], or need more
information from other protocols [1, 40] and the applica-
tion source code [40]. Techniques that rely on traffic vol-
ume analysis can be obfuscated by traffic shaping [1, 8].
Finally, most threat models assume that IP traffic is
sniffed upstream from the home router, while the more
practical scenario where a local attacker sniffs encrypted
Wi-Fi traffic has received less attention [8, 19].
In this paper, we consider the smart home environ-
ment, shown in Figure 1. We experiment with a diverse
range of smart home devices, namely 19 popular Wi-Fi
and Zigbee devices from 16 different vendors, includ-
ing smart plugs, light bulbs, thermostats, home security
systems, etc. We focus on inferring simple commands,
such as “toggle ON”/“toggle OFF”, which we refer to
as events. Limiting the focus on such events has two im-
plications: (i) it enables the extraction of distinct and
accurate network signatures; and (ii) it makes the tech-
niques widely applicable, since all devices, both simple
(e.g., smart plugs) and complex (e.g., smart home as-
sistants) exhibit such events. Our goal is to identify net-
work signatures for device events, based on encrypted
network traffic observed at two different vantage points:
(i) on the ISP side of the home router or (ii) at the local
Wi-Fi network.
During our experimentation with these devices and
our in-depth analysis of their network behavior (see
Section 3.2), we made the key observation that events
on smart home devices typically result in communi-
cation between the device, the smartphone, and the
cloud servers that contains pairs of packets with pre-
dictable lengths. Typically, a packet pair consists of
a request packet from a device/phone (“Ping”) and a
reply packet back to the device/phone (“Pong”). In
most cases, the packet lengths are distinct for differ-
ent types of events, thus one can infer which event
occurred by observing these packet exchanges. Build-
ing on this key observation, we were able to identify
new packet-level signatures (or signatures for short),
which were not previously known. Our packet-level sig-
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natures consist only of the lengths and directions of a
few packets exchanged between a smart home device,
a smartphone, and cloud servers. This pattern can be
generalized into a variety of other commands beyond
“toggle ON/OFF”, e.g., “Intensity”/“Color” for light
bulbs and “Standby”/“Hibernate”/“Active” for sprin-
klers. We show that these signatures can be extracted
in an automated and systematic way, can be used to
infer fine-grained information (e.g., the exact types of
events, which was not previously possible), and have a
number of advantages compared to prior (e.g., volume-
based) signatures. More specifically, this paper makes
the following contributions.
New Packet-Level Signatures. We discover a new
type of network traffic signatures for smart home de-
vices, which was not previously observed. We refer to
these signatures as packet-level signatures. The signa-
tures are simple and minimal: they consist of short
sequences of packets of specific lengths (2 to 6 pack-
ets in total), exchanged between the device, the smart-
phone, and the cloud. The signatures are also effective.
First, they detect event occurrences with an average re-
call of more than 97%, surpassing state-of-the-art tech-
niques [1]. Second, they are unique: we observe a few
false positives (on average 19 per device) in smart home
network traces with tens of millions of packets (see Sec-
tion 5.3). Third, they seem to be universal: we extract
signatures for 18 out of 19 devices (only one UDP-based
device does not follow the request-reply pattern), in-
cluding the most popular home security devices such
as the Ring Alarm Home Security System and Arlo Q
Camera. Fourth, they operate on encrypted traffic and
survive some forms of traffic shaping [8]. Fifth, they al-
low an attacker to detect events quickly as they only
rely on packet lengths and directions, and thus do not
require the attacker to first collect aggregate traffic vol-
ume statistics or prior DNS traffic.
Automated Extraction of Packet-Level Signa-
tures. We present PingPong, a software tool that au-
tomates the extraction of packet-level signatures, and
detects signatures in network traces and real network
traffic. For signature extraction, PingPong first gen-
erates training data by repeatedly triggering the event,
for which a signature is desired, while capturing network
traffic. Next, PingPong extracts pairs of packet lengths
and directions per flow (“Ping-Pong”), clusters these
pairs, and post-processes them to concatenate pairs into
longer sequences where possible. Finally, sequences with
frequencies close to the number of triggered events are
selected for the final signature. The signature detection
part of PingPong leverages the simplicity of packet-
level signatures and is implemented using simple state
machines. Compared to prior unsupervised techniques
for extracting network signatures, PingPong has the
following advantages. First, it uses fewer and simpler
features, namely packet lengths and packet directions,
as opposed to traffic volume [1, 8–12, 25, 34, 35], which
requires more computation and state to be maintained.
Second, as opposed to black-box machine learning tech-
niques [1], the extracted packet-level signatures have an
intuitive explanation: request and reply packets are ex-
changed between the device, the smartphone, and the
cloud; hence, the name PingPong. We plan to make the
PingPong software tool, the collected training data,
and the extracted signatures publicly available.
Two Threat Models. We show that packet-level sig-
natures are observable under two different threat mod-
els. In both threat models, the adversary first uses Ping-
Pong in a controlled environment similar to the one in
Figure 1 to extract signatures for the targeted device(s).
This is done offline prior to the attack. The attack is
then performed by matching the extracted signatures
against traffic at the site of the attack. The threat mod-
els differ in terms of the vantage point where traffic is
inspected and the strategy for how it is matched against
the extracted signatures. The first adversary, referred
to as WAN sniffer, monitors network traffic at the link
that connects the home router to the ISP network. This
adversary has been considered before [8–11], and the
signatures developed therein could typically infer the
device type and whether an event took place, but did
not differentiate types of events (e.g., ON vs. OFF). In
contrast, our signatures can infer the specific type of
event more precisely than the state-of-the-art. The sec-
ond adversary, referred to asWi-Fi sniffer, monitors the
encrypted IEEE 802.11 traffic, and has not been widely
studied before [8, 19]. We show that the Wi-Fi snif-
fer can accurately distinguish between different types of
events, despite not having access to network and trans-
port layer information.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 outlines related work. Section 3 presents our
experimental setup, threat models, and an illustrative
example of packet-level signatures in smart plugs. Sec-
tion 4 presents the design of the PingPong system, in-
cluding extraction and detection of signatures. Section 5
presents the evaluation of PingPong, using our testbed
as well as external, publicly available, packet traces. Sec-
tion 6 concludes and outlines directions for future work.
Due to lack of space, we defer the details of signature
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detection and the sensitivity analysis of PingPong pa-
rameters to Appendices A and B, respectively.
2 Related Work
Security Vulnerabilities. Related work in this area
has identified vulnerabilities that allow hackers to com-
promise Internet of Things (IoT) devices [13, 16–18, 21,
24, 38, 39]. A recent summary of security issues related
to smart home IoT devices can be found in [3]. The
research community is continuously working on iden-
tifying threats [13, 16, 19, 31, 38] and flaws in de-
vices [17, 21, 27] and protocols [16, 18, 24, 39].
Passive Inference Attacks. With respect to privacy
breaches, network traffic analysis techniques have been
recently applied to characterize the type and activity
of IoT devices. The most closely related work to ours,
which appears in the most recent PETS, uses network
traffic volume signatures to infer the presence of IoT de-
vice activity [8–11, 30]. Their work considers the same
two threat models as we do. Our work improves on
this previous work as their volume-based signatures can
only infer the occurrence of some event, while our sig-
natures can infer the exact type of the event. They
propose stochastic traffic padding (STP) as a mitiga-
tion to their volume-based inference attacks, and discuss
two possible implementations of STP: a VPN-based ap-
proach that only defends against WAN sniffers, and a
device-based approach that defends against both Wi-
Fi and WAN sniffers. Our packet-level signatures would
survive many implementations of the proposed device-
based STP as the traffic shaping would leave packet sizes
unchanged.
Other projects focused on specific types of devices
or protocols. In [12], the authors analyze network traffic
to infer the activity specifically for the Nest Thermostat
and Nest Protect (only) and determined with 88% and
67% accuracy that the thermostat transitions between
Home and Auto Away mode and vice versa—leaking
sensitive information that reveals whether the home is
occupied or not. Other work [1, 40] focused on Zigbee/Z-
Wave devices and leveraged specialized Zigbee/Z-Wave
sniffers to collect traffic from these protocols. Since the
format of ZigBee packets is well documented, it facil-
itates the creation of the signatures, which makes the
problem easier than our case. In [40], the authors used
the application source code to correlate Zigbee traffic
and device events. Finally, as far as we know, the Wi-Fi
sniffer threat model has not been widely studied: it has
only been presented in [19] and [8].
Machine Learning for Traffic Analysis. There is
a large body of work within the network measure-
ment community on applying machine learning tech-
niques to network traffic to classify applications and
identify anomalies [22, 23, 26], attacks [14], or mal-
ware [5, 29]. Similar approaches are starting to emerge
for IoT network traffic: in addition to [30] discussed
above, in [25, 34, 35], the authors applied machine learn-
ing to network traffic, and were able to identify device
type and the occurrence of some event, but not the exact
type of the event. In [1], the authors were able to iden-
tify device type and events. However, their techniques
rely on statistical analysis of the TCP/IP network traffic
time series (e.g., mean packet length, inter-arrival time,
standard deviation in packet lengths, etc.) that can eas-
ily be obfuscated by the use of traffic shaping. More-
over, prior unsupervised learning approaches [1] are es-
sentially “blackbox”: they use a large number of fea-
tures to extract events and it is difficult to understand
the underlying cause and limitations of the signatures.
PingPong also uses unsupervised learning (i.e., clus-
tering) to identify the reoccurring packet pairs as the
first step of our approach, but also provides an intuitive
interpretation of those pairs.
Our Work in Perspective. Our work falls within
this broader area of network signatures for IoT devices,
and as such our network signatures have the advantages
of (i) operating on possibly encrypted network traffic,
(ii) not relying on application code or deep packet in-
spection, and (iii) being potentially generally applicable
across several IoT devices. Compared to other state-of-
the-art network signatures for IoT, we make the con-
tributions mentioned in the Introduction. In summary,
PingPong is the only approach that combines all the
following desired features: automated extraction of sig-
natures, yet intuitive interpretation; simple/lightweight
detection; universal applicability across the devices we
examined; uniqueness (in large packet traces) and gran-
ularity (can detect not only the occurrence of an event,
but also the exact type of the event); resilience to traffic
shaping; and applicability to two distinct threat mod-
els (i.e., a WAN sniffer observing IP traffic upstream
from the wireless router, and a Wi-Fi sniffer observing
encrypted traffic on the local Wi-Fi network).
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Fig. 1. Our experimental setup for studying smart home devices.
“Wi-Fi Device” is any smart home device connected to the router
via Wi-Fi (e.g., Amazon and WeMo plugs). “Ethernet Device”
is any smart home device connected to the router via Ethernet
(e.g., SmartThings hub that relays the communication of Zigbee
devices). Smart home device commands may result in commu-
nication between Phone-Cloud, Device-Cloud, or Phone-Device.
There may also be background traffic due to additional comput-
ing devices at home.
3 Problem Setup
In this section, we present the smart home environment
and the passive inference attacks we consider. We also
provide a key insight we obtained by experimenting with
the simplest devices—smart plugs—and by observing
their network traffic caused by ON/OFF events. The
packet sequences we observed in this motivating exam-
ple, inspired the PingPong methodology for automat-
ically extracting signatures (see Section 4).
3.1 Smart Home Environment and
Experimental Testbed
Figure 1 depicts our experimental setup, which resem-
bles a typical smart home environment. In our testbed,
we experiment with a diverse set of 19 widely-used smart
home devices from 16 different vendors (see Table 1).
They are selected to cover a diverse range of function-
ality. The first 12 (highlighted in green) are the most
popular on Amazon [4]: (1) each got the most reviews
for every type (2) with at least 3.5-star rating—they
are both popular and of high quality (e.g., the Nest
T3007ES and Ecobee3 thermostats are the two most-
reviewed with 4-star rating for thermostats). Some of
them are connected to the router via Wi-Fi (e.g., the
Amazon plug) and others through Ethernet. The latter
includes the SmartThings, Sengled, and Hue hubs that
relay communication to/from Zigbee/Z-Wave devices:
the SmartThings plug, Kwikset doorlock, Sengled light
bulb, and Hue light bulb.
No. Device Name Model Details
1. Amazon plug Amazon Smart Plug
2. WeMo plug Belkin WeMo Switch
3. WeMo Insight plug Belkin WeMo Insight Switch
4. Sengled light bulb Sengled Element Classic
5. Hue light bulb Philips Hue white
6. LiFX light bulb LiFX A19
7. Nest thermostat Nest T3007ES
8. Ecobee thermostat Ecobee3
9. Rachio sprinkler Rachio Smart Sprinkler Controller
Generation 2
10. Arlo camera Arlo Q
11. Roomba robot iRobot Roomba 690
12. Ring alarm Ring Alarm Home Security System
13. TP-Link plug TP-Link HS-110
14. D-Link plug D-Link DSP-W215
15. D-Link siren D-Link DCH-S220
16. TP-Link light bulb TP-Link LB-130
17. SmartThings plug Samsung SmartThings Outlet
(2016 model)
18. Blossom sprinkler Blossom 7 Smart Watering Con-
troller
19. Kwikset lock Kwikset SmartCode 910
Table 1. The set of smart home devices considered in this pa-
per. Devices highligted in green are among the most popular on
Amazon.
Each smart home device is controlled from the
Smartphone using its vendor’s official Android applica-
tion. The Controller represents the agent that operates
the smartphone to control the smart home device of in-
terest. This may be done manually by a human (as in
Section 3.2) or through software (as in Section 4). In
addition, there are other computing devices (e.g., lap-
tops, tablets, phones) in the house, generating network
traffic, which we refer to as background traffic.
Smart home device events may result in commu-
nication between three possible pairs, as depicted on
Figure 1: (i) the smartphone and the smart home de-
vice (Phone-Device); (ii) the smart home device and an
Internet host (Device-Cloud), and (iii) the smartphone
and an Internet host (Phone-Cloud). The idea behind a
passive inference attack is that network traffic on these
three possible communication pairs may contain unique
traffic signatures that can, in turn, be exploited to infer
the occurrence of events.
The router in our testbed runs Open-
Wrt/LEDE [28], a Linux-based OS for network devices,
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and serves as our vantage point for collecting traffic
for experiments. We run tcpdump on the router’s WAN
interface (eth0) and local interfaces (wlan1 and eth1)
to capture Internet traffic as well as local traffic for all
Wi-Fi and Ethernet devices. We analyze this traffic for
training and testing purposes.
The aforementioned testbed is used to train on net-
work traffic of each targeted device, extract and store
their signatures in files; see Sections 5.1. In Section 5.2,
the same testbed is used for testing, i.e., to detect the
presence of the stored signatures in traffic generated by
all the devices as well as by other computers in the back-
ground.
3.2 Motivating Special Case: Smart Plugs
As an illustrative example, let us discuss a case study
of 3 smart plugs, namely the TP-Link plug, the D-Link
plug, and the SmartThings plug. Data for the case study
was collected using the setup in Figure 1. For each de-
vice, we toggled it ON, waited for approximately one
minute, and then toggled it OFF. This procedure was
repeated for a total of 3 ON and 3 OFF events, sepa-
rated by one minute in between. Timestamps were man-
ually noted for each event. The PCAP files logged at the
router were analyzed using a combination of scripts and
manual inspection in Wireshark.
New Observation: Packet Pairs. We identified the
traffic flows that occurred immediately after each event
and observed that certain pairs of packets with specific
lengths and directions followed each ON/OFF event: the
same pairs consistently showed up for all events of the
same type (e.g., ON), but were slightly different across
event types (ON vs. OFF). The pairs were comprised
of a request packet in one direction, and a reply packet
in the opposite direction. Intuitively, this makes sense:
if the smart home device changes state, this informa-
tion needs to be sent to (request), and acknowledged
by (reply), the cloud server to enable devices that are
not connected to the home network to query the smart
home device’s current state. These exchanges resemble
the ball that moves back and forth between players in
a game of pingpong, which inspired the name for our
software tool presented in Section 4.
Table 2 illustrates the observed packet exchanges.
For the TP-Link plug, we noticed an exchange of 2 TLS
Application Data packets between the plug and an In-
ternet host where the packet lengths were 556 and 1293
when the plug was toggled ON, but 557 and 1294 for
OFF. We did not observe any pattern in the D-Link
plug’s own communication. However, for ON events,
the controlling smartphone would always send a request
packet of length 1117 to an Internet host and receive
a reply packet of length 613. For OFF, these packets
were of lengths 1118 and 613, respectively. Similarly for
the SmartThings plug, we found consistently occurring
packet pairs in the smartphone’s communication with
two different Internet hosts where the lengths of the re-
quest packets were different for ON and OFF events (see
Table 2). Thus, this request-reply pattern can occur in
the communication of any of the three pairs: Phone-
Device, Device-Cloud, or Phone-Cloud (see Figure 1).
Key Insight. This preliminary analysis indicates that
each type of event is uniquely identified by the ex-
change of pairs (or longer sequences) of packets of spe-
cific lengths. To the best of our knowledge, this type
of network signature has not been observed before, and
we refer to it as a packet-level signature. This discovery
intrigued us to investigate whether: (1) more devices,
beyond just smart plugs, exhibit their own packet-level
signatures following an event, (2) packet-level signatures
can be automatically extracted, and (3) packet-level sig-
natures are accurate for detecting events while avoiding
false positives. The design and evaluation of PingPong
answers all these questions with a resounding YES.
3.3 Passive Inference: Two Threat Models
We consider two different threat models, referred to as
WAN sniffer andWi-Fi sniffer, respectively, depicted in
Figure 1. In both models, the adversary is a passive net-
work traffic observer whose goal is to infer events that
occurred in the smart home by detecting signatures in
the observed network traffic. The adversary does not at-
tempt to modify, nor inject, traffic, and does not have
access to the smart home hardware. Moreover, both
adversaries only consider information that is available
in the clear, namely protocol headers, and, in contrast
to other systems [20, 33], do not perform deep packet
inspection. Prior to the attack, both adversaries have
determined what devices they want to attack and ex-
tracted signatures by profiling those devices in a con-
trolled environment similar to the one in Figure 1. The
attack is performed by matching the signatures against
traffic at the site of the attack.
WAN sniffer. The WAN sniffer observes network traf-
fic at or upstream of the home router’s WAN interface.
Using the IP and TCP headers, which are available in
plaintext, the WAN sniffer can separate the stream of
packets into TCP connections, and analyze each con-
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Table 2. Packet-level signatures of TP-Link, D-Link, and SmartThings smart plugs observable by the WAN sniffer. The numbers repre-
sent packet lengths, with red indicating that the length is different for ON vs. OFF, and the arrows represent packet directions.
nection for the presence of packet-level signatures. Ad-
ditionally, by keeping track of TCP sequence numbers,
the adversary may detect and discard retransmissions.
Finally, by examining the IP header’s source and desti-
nation fields for the presence of the router’s WAN port’s
IP, the WAN sniffer can determine each packet’s direc-
tion, i.e., whether the packet originates from a host in
the smart home (the smart home device or the smart-
phone that controls it) and is destined for an Internet
host (referred to as client-to-server), or vice versa (re-
ferred to as server-to-client). Unlike previous work [1, 9–
12, 12, 25, 34, 35], the WAN sniffer does not need specific
information about Internet endpoints (e.g., IP address
or hostname) or network traffic volume.
Wi-Fi sniffer. Similar to [8, 19], we consider an at-
tacker who is in range to eavesdrop on the smart home’s
encrypted Wi-Fi traffic, but who is not part of the local
network. As the encryption added by WPA2 does not
pad packet lengths, signatures extracted from TCP/IP
traffic can be directly mapped to layer 2 if the IEEE
802.11 radiotap header, frame header, the AES-CCMP
IV and key identifier, and FCS are accounted for. In our
testbed, these consistently add 80 bytes to the packet
length. While the WAN sniffer is only able to observe
Internet traffic (Phone-Cloud and Device-Cloud in Fig-
ure 1), the Wi-Fi sniffer observes all traffic on the Wi-Fi,
including local traffic (Phone-Device in Figure 1). We
assume that the Wi-Fi sniffer does not know the target
device’s full MAC address up front, but can filter by
device vendor prefix when searching for Device-Cloud
or Phone-Device signatures since the vendor prefix is
already known in advance as the device used for train-
ing has the same prefix. For Phone-Cloud signatures, we
assume no knowledge of MAC prefix as there are many
Android smartphone manufacturers in the market.
The Wi-Fi sniffer has the disadvantage of only hav-
ing access to layer-2 header information due to WPA2
encryption. This means that they cannot reconstruct
TCP connections, but can only separate traffic into
flows of packets exchanged between pairs of MAC ad-
dresses, referred to as layer-2 flows. Consequently, when
trying to detect a signature in a layer-2 flow, the Wi-Fi
sniffer must use a more relaxed approach to matching:
packets are allowed to be present in between the packets
of the signature to accommodate other network-layer
flows going on in parallel between the two MAC ad-
dresses.
4 PingPong Design
The key insight obtained from the special case in Sec-
tion 3.2 was that unique sequences of packet lengths
(for packet pairs or longer packet sequences) typically
follow simple events (e.g., ON vs. OFF) on smart plugs,
and can potentially be exploited as network signatures
to infer these events. This observation motivated us to
investigate whether: (1) more smart home devices, and
potentially the smartphones that control them as well,
exhibit their own unique packet-level sequences follow-
ing an event, (2) these signatures can be learned and
automatically extracted and from which vantage points
in the network, and (3) they are sufficiently unique to ac-
curately detect events. In this section, we present the de-
sign of PingPong—a system that addresses the above
questions with a resounding YES.
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Fig. 2. Left: PingPong Overview. Right: TP-Link plug as an
example for extracting and detecting signatures
PingPong automates the collection of training
data, extraction of packet-level signatures, and detec-
tion of the occurrence of a signature in a network
trace. PingPong has two components: (1) training
(Section 4.1), and (2) detection (Sections 4.2 and Ap-
pendix A). Figure 2 shows the building blocks and flow
of PingPong on the left-hand side, and the TP-Link
plug as an example that illustrates the process in every
block on the right-hand side. We will use the latter as
a running example throughout this section.
4.1 Training
The training component is responsible for the extraction
of packet-level signatures for a device the attacker wants
to profile and attack. It consists of 5 steps (see Figure 2).
Data Collection. The first step towards signature gen-
eration is to collect a training set for the device. A train-
ing set is a network trace (a PCAP file) that contains the
network traffic generated by the device and smartphone
as a result of a event. The setup for training set collec-
tion is comprised of the smart home device, a router, an
Android smartphone, and a laptop as Controller (see
Figure 1). The device vendor’s official Android app is
installed on the smartphone, and the smartphone is con-
nected to the laptop via USB.
PingPong partially automates training set collec-
tion by providing a shell script that uses the Android
Debug Bridge (adb) [7] to issue touch inputs on the
smartphone’s screen. The script is tailored to issue the
sequence of touch events corresponding to the events for
which a training set is to be generated. For example, if
a training set is desired for a smart plug’s ON and OFF
events, the script issues a touch event at the screen co-
ordinates that correspond to the respective buttons in
the user interface of the plug’s official Android app. As
device vendors may choose arbitrary positions for the
buttons in their respective Android applications, and
since the feature sets differ from device to device, the
script must be manually modified for the given device.
The script issues the touch sequence corresponding to
each specific event n times, each separated by m sec-
onds. The results reported in this paper uses n = 50 or
n = 100 depending on the event type (see Section 5.1)
and m = 131. The script also outputs the current times-
tamp to a file on the laptop when it issues a event. Af-
ter we run tcpdump on the router’s interfaces (see Sec-
tion 3), the script is started. The tcpdump processes are
terminated shortly after the n-th event has been issued.
This leaves us with a set of PCAP files, which constitute
our raw training set.
We base our signature generation on the traces col-
lected from the router’s local interfaces as they are the
vantage points that provide the most comprehensive in-
formation: they include both local traffic and Internet
traffic. This allows PingPong to exhaustively analyze
all network packets generated in the communications
between the device, smartphone, and Internet hosts on
a per device basis. As signatures are based entirely on
packet lengths and directions, signatures present in In-
ternet traffic (i.e., Device-Cloud and Phone-Cloud traf-
fic) are applicable on the WAN side of the router, de-
spite being extracted from traces captured within the
local network
Trace Filtering. Next, PingPong filters the collected
raw training set to discard traffic that is unrelated to
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Fig. 3. Pair clustering and signature creation for 2 extreme cases of devices—TP-Link plug has the simplest signature with only 1 pair
(see our initial findings in Table 2). The Arlo camera has the most complex signature with 1 sequence of 2 pairs and 1 sequence of 1
pair. The left subfigure, in every row, depicts the packet lengths in one packet pair (Pc1 , Pc2 ). Notation: C->S means Client-to-Server ;
S->C means Server-to-Client; f: 50 means that the pair appears in the clustering with a frequency of 50 ; Signature notation shows
a summary of 2 sets of 50 instances of packet sequences. Example: S->C 556, 1293 f: 50 means that 50 pairs of packets with
lengths 556 and 1293 appear 50 times in the dataset.
a user’s operation of a smart home device. All packets,
where neither the source nor destination IP matches
that of the device or the controlling smartphone, are
dropped. Additionally, all packets that do not lie within
a time window t after each timestamped event are dis-
carded. We selected t = 15 seconds to ensure that we
have allowed sufficient time for all network traffic re-
lated to the event to complete. We issue events every
131 seconds to allow sufficient time such that there is no
overlap between events, while minimizing the total time
needed to train. We then performed a further sensitivity
study that confirmed this was a conservative choice (see
Appendix B).
PingPong next reassembles all TCP connec-
tions in the filtered trace by considering the
4-tuple <source_IP, source_port, destination_IP,
destination_port> and by observing any interleaved
SYNs, FINs, and RSTs with a matching 4-tuple. The
latter is meant to also cover the corner case where two
subsequent TCP connections end up sharing the same
ephemeral port number. Finally, all TCP retransmis-
sions are discarded from the trace by maintaining a set
of the previously seen sequence numbers for each of the
two packet directions of a single TCP connection.
Given the set of reassembled TCP connections, we
now turn our attention to the packets P that carry TCP
payload. For TLS connections, P is limited further to
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only be the subset of packets that are labeled as “Appli-
cation Data” in the unencrypted TLS record header [6].
By only considering packets in P , we ensure that the in-
herently unpredictable control packets (e.g., TCP ACKs
and TLS key negotiation) do not become part of the sig-
nature as P only contains packets with application layer
payload.
We next construct the set P � by forming packet
pairs from the packets in P (see Definition 4.1). This
is motivated by the following observation: the deter-
ministic sequence of packets that make up packet-
level signatures often stem from a request-reply ex-
change between the device, smartphones, and some
Internet hosts (see Section 3.2). Furthermore, since
a packet pair is the simplest possible pattern, and
since longer patterns (i.e., packet sequences—see
Definition 4.2) can be reconstructed from packet
pairs, we look for these packet pairs in the train-
ing set. For the TP-Link plug example in Figure 2,
PingPong reassembles <..., C-556, S-1293, ...>,
<..., C-237, S-826, ...>, etc. as TCP connections.
Then, PingPong extracts <C-556, S-1293>, <C-237,
S-826>, etc. as packet pairs.
Definition 4.1. Packet Pair. Let Pc be the or-
dered set of packets with TCP payload that be-
long to TCP connection c, let Pci denote the i-th
packet in Pc, and let C and S each denote client-to-
server and server-to-client packet directions respec-
tively, where a client is a smartphone or a device.
A packet pair p is then p = (C−Pci , S−Pci+1) or
p = (S−Pci , C−Pci+1) iff Pci and Pci+1 go in op-
posite directions. Otherwise, if Pci and Pci+1 go in
the same direction, or if Pci is the last packet in Pc,
the packet pair p = (C−Pci , nil) or p = (S−Pci , nil)
is formed, and packet Pci+1 , if any, is paired with
packet Pci+2 .
Pair Clustering. After forming a set of packet pairs,
relevant packet pairs (i.e., those that consistently occur
after an event) must next be separated from irrelevant
ones. This selection also needs to take into account that
the potentially relevant packet pairs may have slight
variations in lengths. Since we do not know in advance
the packet lengths in the pairs, we use an unsupervised
learning algorithm: DBSCAN [15].
This is an attempt to group packet pairs that are
similar in terms of packet lengths and directions. DB-
SCAN is provided with a distance function for compar-
ing the similarity of two packet pairs, say p1 and p2.
The distance is maximal if the packet directions are dif-
ferent, e.g., if p1 is comprised of a packet going from
a local device to an Internet host followed by a packet
going from an Internet host to a local device, while p2
is comprised of a packet going from an Internet host to
a local device followed by packet going from a local de-
vice to an Internet host. If the packet directions match,
the distance is simply the Euclidean distance between
the two pairs, i.e.,
��
p11 − p21
�2 + �p12 − p22�2, where pij
refers to the packet length of the j-th element of pair i.
DBSCAN’s parameters are � and minPts, which specify
the neighborhood radius to consider when determining
core points and the minimum number of points in that
neighborhood for a point to become a core point re-
spectively. We choose � = 10 and minPts = �n − 0.1n�,
where n is the total number of events. We allow a slack
of 0.1n to minPts to take into account that event-related
traffic could occasionally have missing pairs, for exam-
ple, caused by the phone app not responding to some
of the automated events. We study the sensitivity of
PingPong parameter values in Appendix B.
Part (a) of Figure 3 illustrates the pair clustering
process for the TP-Link plug. As there are 50 ON ac-
tions and 50 OFF actions, there has to be at least 45
(n = 50 =⇒ minPts = �50 − 0.1 × 50� = 45) simi-
lar packet pairs to form a cluster. In the example, two
clusters are formed among the data points, namely the
clusters with frequencies f: 50 and f: 98, respectively.
Since these two clusters contain similar packet pairs that
occur once or more during t, this indicates with high
confidence that the packets are related to the event.
Signature Creation. Given the output produced by
DBSCAN, PingPong next drops all clusters whose fre-
quencies are not in the interval [�n− 0.1n�, �n+ 0.1n�]
in order to only include in the signature those clus-
ters whose frequencies align closely with the num-
ber of events n. Intuitively, this step is to deal with
chatty devices, namely devices that communicate con-
tinuously/periodically while not generating events. Con-
sequently, PingPong only picks the cluster Pair 1
with frequency 50 for the TP-Link plug example in
Figure 3 as a signature candidate since 50 is in
[�n− 0.1n�, �n+ 0.1n�] = [45, 55] when n = 50, whereas
98 is not. As a pair from this cluster occurs exactly once
during t, there is high confidence that the pair is related
to the event.
We next attempt to concatenate the packet pairs
in the clusters, seeking to reassemble the longest packet
sequences possible (see Definition 4.2). This increases
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the odds that a signature remains unique among other
traffic. Naturally, packet pair concatenation is only per-
formed when a device has more than one cluster. This is
the case for the Arlo camera, but not the TP-Link plug.
Packet pairs in clusters x and y are concatenated iff for
each packet pair px in x, there exists a packet pair py in
y such that px and py occurred consecutively in the same
TCP connection. If there are more pairs in y than in x,
said pairs of y are simply dropped when forming the
concatenated cluster. The resulting concatenated clus-
ter is referred to as a set of packet sequences (see Def-
inition 4.3), and is reconsidered for concatenation with
other clusters if possible.
Definition 4.2. Packet Sequence. A packet se-
quence s is formed by joining packet pairs p1 and p2
iff p1 and p2 are both in Pc (same TCP connection)
and the packets in p1 occur immediately before the
packets in p2 in Pc. Note that the packet sequence
s resulting from joining p1 and p2 can be of length
2, 3 or 4, depending on whether or not the second
element of p1 and/or p2 is nil.
Definition 4.3. Set of Packet Sequences. A set
of packet sequences S is a set of similar packet se-
quences. Two packet sequences s1 and s2 are sim-
ilar and thus belong to the same set S iff they (1)
contain the same number of packets, (2) the pack-
ets at corresponding indices of s1 and s2 go in the
same direction, and (3) the Euclidean distance be-
tween the packet lengths at corresponding indices
of s1 and s2 is below a threshold—packet lengths in
packet sequences inherit the slight variations that
stem from packet pairs.
Part (b) of Figure 3 shows how pair clustering produces
3 clusters around the pairs <C-339, S-329> (i.e., cluster
Pairs 1), <C-[364-365], S-[1061-1070]> (i.e., clus-
ter Pairs 2), and <C-[271-273], S-[499-505]> (i.e.,
cluster Pairs 3) for the Arlo camera. The notation
C-[l1 − l2] or S-[l1 − l2] means that the packet length
may vary in the range between l1 and l2. Each pair
from cluster Pairs 1 and each pair from cluster Pairs 2
are then concatenated into a sequence in Sequences 1
(a set of packet sequences) as they appear consecu-
tively in the same TCP connection, i.e., Pair 1.1 with
Pair 2.1, Pair 1.2 with Pair 2.2, ..., Pair 1.50 with
Pair 2.50. The cluster Pairs 3 is finalized as the set
Sequences 2 as its members appear in different TCP
connections than the members of Sequences 1. Thus,
the initial 3 clusters of packet pairs are reduced to 2 sets
of packet sequences. For the TP-Link plug, no concate-
nation is performed since there is only a single cluster,
Pairs 1, which is finalized as the set Sequences 1.
Finally, we sort the sets of packet sequences based
on the timing of the sets’ members to form a list of
packet sequence sets (see Definition 4.4). For example,
for the Arlo camera, this step produces a list in which
the set Sequences 1 precedes the set Sequences 2 be-
cause there is always a packet sequence in Sequences 1
that precedes a packet sequence in Sequences 2. The
purpose of this step is to make the temporal order of
the sets of packet sequences part of the final signature.
If no such order can be established, the set with the
shorter packet sequences is discarded. Manual inspec-
tion of some devices suggests that the earlier sequence
will often be the control command sent from an Inter-
net host followed by the device’s acknowledgment of the
command, while the later sequence will stem from the
device initiating communication with some other Inter-
net host to inform that host about its change in status.
Definition 4.4. List of Packet Sequence Sets.
A list of packet sequence sets is a list that contains
sets of packet sequences that are sorted based on
the occurrence of the set members in time. Set Sx
goes before set Sy iff for each sequence sx in Sx,
there exists a sequence sy in Sy that occurred after
sx within t.
Signature Validation. Before finalizing the signature,
we validate it by running the detection algorithm (see
Section 4.2) against the raw training set that was used
to generate the signature. If PingPong detects at most
n events, and the timestamps of detected events match
the timestamps for events recorded during training, the
signature is finalized as a valid packet-level signature
(see Definition 4.5) and stored in a signature file. A
signature can fail this check if it detects more events
than the actual number of events in the training set (i.e.,
false positives). This can happen if the packet sequences
in the signature frequently appear outside t.
Definition 4.5. Packet-level Signature. A
packet-level signature is then a list of packet se-
quence sets that has been validated and finalized.
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Signature File. A signature file stores a packet-level
signature. Figure 3 shows that the TP-Link plug sig-
nature consists of 50 instances of packet sequences in
set Sequences 1, but only one instance will be used
during detection since all 50 are identical. Figure 3-
(b) shows the signature file for the Arlo camera. It
is a list that orders the two sets of packet sequences,
Sequences 1 and Sequences 2. Sequences 1 is com-
prised of 50 packet sequences, each comprised of two
packet pairs. Sequences 2 is comprised of another 50
packet sequences, each comprised of a single packet pair.
Since the sequences vary slightly in each set, all unique
variations are considered during detection.
4.2 Detection
For signature detection, PingPong treats a network
trace as a stream of packets and presents each individ-
ual packet to a set of state machines. A state machine is
maintained for each packet sequence of the signature for
each flow, i.e., TCP connection for the WAN sniffer or
layer-2 flow for the Wi-Fi sniffer (see Sec. 3.3). A packet
is only presented to the state machines associated with
the flow that the packet pertains to. A state machine ad-
vances to its next state if the packet’s length and direc-
tion matches the next packet in the modeled packet se-
quence. The state machines respond differently to pack-
ets that do not match the expected next packet depend-
ing on whether detection is applied at layer-2 or layer-3.
For layer-2, such packets are simply ignored, whereas for
layer-3 such packets cause the state machine to discard
the current partial match (see Sec. 3.3). When a state
machine reaches its terminal state, the packet sequence
match is reported to a secondary module. This module
waits for a packet sequence match for each packet se-
quence of the signature and verifies the inter-sequence
timing constraints before finally declaring a signature
match. Due to lack of space, we defer a more detailed
explanation of the detection to Appendix A.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of PingPong.
In Section 5.1, we show that PingPong was able to au-
tomatically extract event signatures for 18 devices as
summarized in Table 3—11 of them are the most pop-
ular devices on Amazon (see Table 1). Section 5.2 uses
the extracted signatures to detect events in a trace col-
Device Event Device- Phone- Phone-
Cloud Cloud Device
Amazon
plug
ON/OFF � × ×
WeMo plug ON/OFF × × �
WeMo ON/OFF × × �
Insight plug
Sengled ON/OFF � � ×
light bulb Intensity � � ×
Hue light ON/OFF × × �
bulb
Nest Fan ON/OFF × � ×
thermostat
Ecobee HVAC Auto/OFF × � ×
thermostat Fan ON/Auto × � ×
Rachio Quick Run/Stop � × ×
sprinkler Standby/Active � × ×
Arlo camera Stream ON/OFF × � ×
Roomba Clean/ × � ×
robot Back-to-station
Ring alarm Arm/Disarm � × ×
TP-Link
plug
ON/OFF � × �
D-Link plug ON/OFF � � ×
D-Link siren ON/OFF × � ×
TP-Link ON/OFF × × �
light bulb Intensity × × �
Color × × �
SmartThings
plug
ON/OFF × � ×
Blossom Quick Run/Stop � � ×
sprinkler Hibernate/Active × � ×
Kwikset
lock
Lock/Unlock × � ×
Table 3. Summary of Signatures (�= signature extracted; × =
signature not found).
lected from a realistic experiment on our smart home
testbed. Section 5.3 presents the results of negative con-
trol experiments: it demonstrates the uniqueness of the
PingPong signatures in large (i.e., with tens of millions
of packets), publicly available, packet traces from smart
home and office environments. Due to lack of space, we
discuss the selection and sensitivity analysis of Ping-
Pong parameters in Appendix B.
5.1 Extracting Signatures from Smart
Home Devices
Training Dataset. In order to evaluate the general-
izability of packet-level analysis, we first used Ping-
Pong to automate the collection of training sets (see
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Matching
Device Event Signature Comm. Duration (ms) (Per 100 Events)
Min./Avg./Max. WAN Fal. Wi-Fi Fal.
Snif. Pos. Snif. Pos.
Amazon ON S1: S-[443-445] Device-Cloud 1,232 / 2,465 / 4,537 98 0 99 0
plug S2: C-1099 S-235
OFF S1: S-[444-446]
S2: C-1179 S-235
S3: C-1514 C-103 S-235
WeMo plug ON/OFF S1: PH-259 PH-475 D-246 Phone-Device 33 / 42 / 134 N/A N/A 100 0
WeMo ON/OFF S1: PH-259 PH-475 D-246 Phone-Device 32 / 39 / 97 N/A N/A 99 0
Insight plug
Sengled ON S1: S-[217-218] C-[209-210] Device-Cloud 4,304 / 6,238 / 8,145 97 0 N/A N/A
light bulb S2: C-430
S3: C-466
OFF S1: S-[217-218] C-[209-210]
S2: C-430
S3: C-465
ON S1: C-211 S-1063 Phone-Cloud 4,375 / 6,356 / 9,132 93 0 97 0
S2: S-1277
OFF S1: C-211 S-1063 S-1276
Intensity S1: S-[216-220] Device-Cloud 16 / 74 / 824 99 2 N/A N/A
C-[208-210]
Intensity S1: C-[215-217] Phone-Cloud 3,916 / 5,573 / 7,171 99 0 99 0
S-[1275-1277]
Hue light ON S1: PH-229 D-569 Phone-Device 12 / 14 / 25 N/A N/A N/A N/A
bulb OFF S1: PH-230 D-570
Nest Fan ON S1: C-[891-894] S-[830-834] Phone-Cloud 91 / 111 / 1,072 93 0 92 1
thermostat Fan OFF S1: C-[858-860] S-[829-834]
Ecobee HVAC Auto S1: S-1300 C-640 Phone-Cloud 121 / 229 / 667 100 0 99 0
thermostat HVAC OFF S1: C-1299 C-640
Fan ON S1: S-1387 C-640 Phone-Cloud 117 / 232 / 1,776 100 0 100 0
Fan Auto S1: C-1389 C-640
Rachio Quick Run S1: S-267 C-155 Device-Cloud 1,972 / 2,180 / 2,450 100 0 100 0
sprinkler Stop S1: C-496 C-155 C-395
Standby/Active S1: S-299 C-155 C-395 Device-Cloud 276 / 690 / 2,538 100 0 100 0
Arlo Stream ON S1: C-[338-339] S-[326-329] Phone-Cloud 46 / 78 / 194 99 2 98 3
camera C-[364-365] S-[1061-1070]
S2: C-[271-273] S-[499-505]
Stream OFF S1: C-[445-449] S-442
Roomba Clean S1: S-[1014-1015] C-105 Phone-Cloud 123 / 2,038 / 5,418 91* 0 94* 0
robot S-432 C105
Back-to- S1: S-440 C-105
station S-[1018-1024] C-105
Ring Arm S1: S-99 S-254 C-99 Device-Cloud 275 / 410 / 605 98 0 95 0
alarm S-[181-183] C-99
Disarm S1: S-99 S-255 C-99
S-[181-183] C-99
TP-Link ON S1: C-556 S-1293 Device-Cloud 75 / 85 / 204 99 0 99 0
plug OFF S1: C-557 S-[1294-1295]
ON/OFF S1: PH-112 D-115 Phone-Device 2 / 4 / 39 N/A N/A N/A N/A
D-Link ON/OFF S1: S-91 S-1227 C-784 Device-Cloud 4 / 1,194 / 8,060 95 0 95 0
plug S2: C-1052 S-647
ON S1: C-[1109-1123] S-613 Phone-Cloud 35 / 41 / 176 98 0 98 0
OFF S1: C-[1110-1124] S-613
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Matching
Device Event Signature Comm. Duration (ms) (Per 100 Events)
Min./Avg./Max. WAN Fal. Wi-Fi Fal.
Snif. Pos. Snif. Pos.
D-Link ON S1: C-1076 S-593 Phone-Cloud 36 / 37 / 65 100 0 98 0
siren OFF S1: C-1023 S-613
TP-Link ON S1: PH-198 D-227 Phone-Device 8 / 77 / 148 N/A N/A 100 4
light bulb OFF S1: PH-198 D-244
Intensity S1: PH-[240-242] D-[287-289] Phone-Device 7 / 84 / 212 N/A N/A 100 0
Color S1: PH-317 D-287 Phone-Device 6 / 89 / 174 N/A N/A 100 0
Smart- ON S1: C-699 S-511 Phone-Cloud 335 / 537 / 2,223 92 0 92 0
Things S2: S-777 C-136
plug OFF S1: C-700 S-511
S2: S-780 C-136
Blossom Quick Run S1: C-326 Device-Cloud 701 / 3,470 / 8,431 96* 0 96* 0
sprinkler S2: C-177 S-505
Stop S1: C-326
S2: C-177 S-458
S3: C-238 C-56 S-388
Quick Run S1: C-649 S-459 C-574 S-507 Phone-Cloud 70 / 956 / 3,337 93* 0 93* 0
S2: S-[135-139]
Stop S1: C-617 S-431
Hibernate S1: C-621 S-493 Phone-Cloud 121 / 494 / 1,798 95 0 93 0
Active S1: C-622 S-494
S2: S-599 C-566 S-554 C-566
Kwikset Lock S1: C-699 S-511 Phone-Cloud 173 / 395 / 2,874 100 0 100 0
door S2: S-639 C-136
lock Unlock S1: C-701 S-511
S2: S-647 C-136
Table 4. Smart home devices found to exhibit Phone-Cloud, Device-Cloud, and Phone-Device signatures (prefix PH indicates Phone-
to-device direction and prefix D indicates Device-to-phone direction; the duration of each signature is measured from the first packet of
the first sequence S1 to the last packet of the last sequence Sn; *the Roomba robot had a few events missed because the device failed
to return to the base station after a back-to-station command at the time the app issued the following clean command; the Blossom
sprinkler also had a few events missed because the app reported connection lost for some triggers).
Section 4.1) for all 19 smart home devices (see Table 1).
Training sets were collected for every device under test,
individually without any background traffic (see Fig-
ure 1). The automation script generated a total of 100
events for the device. For events with binary values, the
script generated n = 50 events for each event type (e.g.,
50 ON and 50 OFF events). For events with continuous
values, the script generated n = 100 events (e.g., 100
Intensity events for the Sengled light bulb).
Results Summary. For each training set, we next used
PingPong to extract packet-level signatures (see Sec-
tion 4.1) for each event type of the respective device.
In summary, PingPong extracted signatures from 18
devices; see Table 3.
PingPong found packet-level signatures that are
observable in the device’s Phone-Cloud, Device-Cloud,
and Phone-Device communications; see Table 3. We
found that 14 devices have signatures that are observ-
able in the device’s Phone-Cloud or Device-Cloud com-
munication, or both. Although the traffic is typically
encrypted using TLSv1.2, the event still manifests itself
in the form of a packet-level signature. PingPong also
extracted signatures from the Phone-Device communi-
cation for 5 devices. These signatures are extracted from
unencrypted local TCP/HTTP communication between
the smartphone and the device.
Table 4 presents the signatures that PingPong
identified. Each line in a signature cell represents a
packet sequence set, and the vertical positioning of these
lines reflects the ordering of the packet sequence sets in
the signature; see Section 4.1 for the notation definition.
Smart Plugs. PingPong extracted signatures from all
6 plugs: the Amazon, WeMo, WeMo Insight, TP-Link,
D-Link, and SmartThings plugs. The Amazon, D-Link,
and SmartThings plugs have signatures in the Phone-
Cloud or Device-Cloud communication, or both. The
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TP-Link plug has signatures in both the Device-Cloud
and Phone-Device communications. Both the WeMo
and WeMo Insight plugs have signatures in the Phone-
Device communication. In general, the signatures allow
us to differentiate ON from OFF except for the WeMo,
WeMo Insight, and TP-Link plugs’ Phone-Device com-
munication, and D-Link plug’s Device-Cloud communi-
cation (see Table 3).
Light Bulbs. PingPong extracted signatures from 3
light bulbs: the Sengled, Hue, and TP-Link light bulbs.
The Sengled light bulb has signatures in both the
Phone-Cloud and Device-Cloud communications. Both
the Hue and TP-Link light bulbs have signatures in
the Phone-Device communication. Table 3 shows that
PingPong also extracted signatures for events other
than ON and OFF: Intensity for the Sengled light bulb,
and Intensity and Color for the TP-Link light bulb.
Thermostats. PingPong extracted signatures for both
the Nest and Ecobee thermostats. Both thermostats
have Phone-Cloud signatures. The signatures allow us
to differentiate Fan ON/OFF/Auto events. The Ecobee
thermostat’s signatures also leak information about its
HVAC Auto/OFF events.
Sprinklers. PingPong extracted signatures from both
the Rachio sprinkler and Blossom sprinkler. Both
sprinklers have signatures in both the Device-
Cloud and Phone-Cloud communications. The signa-
tures allow us to differentiate Quick Run/Stop and
Standby/Hibernate/Active events.
Home Security Devices. A highlight of our results is that
PingPong extracted signatures from home security de-
vices. Notably, the Ring alarm has signatures that allow
us to differentiate Arm/Disarm events in the Device-
Cloud communication. The Arlo camera has signa-
tures for Stream ON/OFF events, the D-Link siren for
ON/OFF events, and the Kwikset lock for Lock/Unlock
events in the Phone-Cloud communication.
Finally, PingPong also extracted signatures from
the Roomba robot in the Phone-Cloud. These signatures
allow us to differentiate Clean/Back-to-station events.
Signature Validity. Recall that signature valida-
tion rejects a signature candidate whose sequences are
present not only in the time window t, but also dur-
ing the subsequent idle period (see Section 4.1). We
saw such a signature candidate for one device, namely
the LiFX light bulb. PingPong captured a signature
candidate that is present also in the idle period of the
TCP communication. Manual inspection revealed that
the LiFX light bulb uses unidirectional UDP commu-
nication (i.e., no request-reply pattern) for events. We
then drop such a signature candidate.
5.2 Smart Home Testbed Experiment
Testing Dataset. To see how effective the packet-level
signatures are in detecting events, we collected a sepa-
rate set of testing network traces and used PingPong
to perform detection on them. We used the setup for
dataset collection presented in Section 3.1 to collect one
dataset for every device. Our smart home setup con-
sists of 13 of the smart home devices presented in Ta-
ble 1: the WeMo plug, WeMo Insight plug, Hue light
bulb, LiFX light bulb, Nest thermostat, Arlo camera,
TP-Link plug, D-Link plug, D-Link siren, TP-Link light
bulb, SmartThings plug, Blossom sprinkler, and Kwik-
set lock. While collecting a dataset, we generated events
for the device under test. At the same time, we also con-
nected the other 12 devices and activated them (e.g.,
toggled the smart plugs ON) so that they would gener-
ate network traffic. However, we do not generate events
for these other devices. For the other 6 devices (the
Amazon plug, Sengled light bulb, Ecobee thermostat,
Rachio sprinkler, Roomba robot, and Ring alarm), we
generated events for the device under test while activat-
ing all the 13 devices to generate network traffic without
generating any events.
To generate background traffic as depicted in Fig-
ure 1, we also set up 3 general purpose devices: a Mo-
torola Moto g6 phone that would play a Youtube video
playlist, a Google Nexus 5 phone that would play a
Spotify song playlist, and an Apple MacBook Air that
would randomly browse top 10 websites [2] every 10-
500 seconds. We used this setup to emulate the network
traffic from a smart home when all devices are active.
Results Summary. The average recall of our packet-
level signatures is 97.3%: 91-100 matches per 100 ex-
pected events for the 18 devices with signatures (see Ta-
ble 4). For some devices, we do not get 100 matches for
certain events. In some cases, the events were not gen-
erated due to app bugs or device-specific issues. Manual
inspection revealed that in other cases, the signatures
were only partially present or they are present with more
variations, e.g., S2: S-777 C-136 for the SmartThings
plug might become S2: S-612 C-136 in some occasions.
False Positives. For both strategies, we have a low
rate of false positives. For the WAN sniffer, there are 2
false positives for the Sengled light bulb’s Intensity, and
2 false positives for the Arlo camera’s Stream ON/OFF.
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For the Wi-Fi sniffer, there are 1 false positive for the
Nest thermostat’s Fan ON/OFF, 3 false positives for the
Arlo camera’s Stream ON/OFF, and 4 false positives for
the TP-Link light bulb’s ON/OFF.
5.3 Negative Control Experiment
If the packet-level signatures are to be used to detect
events in traffic in the wild, they must be sufficiently
unique for each device compared to other traffic to avoid
generating false positives. We evaluated the uniqueness
of the signatures by performing signature detection on
two datasets. The first dataset consists of traffic gener-
ated by similar devices (i.e., other smart home devices),
while the second dataset serves to evaluate the unique-
ness of the signatures among traffic generated by general
purpose computational devices.
Dataset 1: UNSW Smart Home Traffic Dataset.
The first dataset [35] contains network traces for 26
smart home devices that are different from the devices
that we generated signatures for. The list can be found
in [37]. The dataset is a collection of 19 PCAP files, with
a total size of 12.5GB and a total of 23,013,502 packets.
Dataset 2: UNB Simulated Office-Space Traffic
Dataset. This is the Monday trace of the CICIDS2017
dataset [32] and it contains simulated network traffic for
an office space with two servers and 10 laptops/desktops
with diverse operating systems. The dataset we used is a
single PCAP file of 10.82GB, with a total of 11,709,971
packets observed at the WAN interface.
Results Summary. For both datasets, we performed
signature detection for all devices using the WAN sniffer
for devices with Phone-Cloud and Device-Cloud signa-
tures, and the Wi-Fi sniffer for all 12 devices.
WAN Sniffer. There was no false positive across
23,013,502 packets in dataset 1, while there is 1 false
positive for the Nest thermostat across 11,709,971 pack-
ets in dataset 2.
Wi-Fi Sniffer. PingPong detected some false positives
due to its more relaxed matching strategy (see Ap-
pendix A). The results, summarized in Table 5, show
that the extracted packet-level signatures are unique:
the average is less than 19 false positives per device
across a total of 34,723,473 packets from both datasets.
The signatures for some devices are sufficiently unique
to use as is. Other devices have signatures with a higher
number of false positives and may require additional
measures (such as filtering by MAC address prefixes) to
reduce the false positive rate.
Device Event False Positives
Data. 1 Data. 2
Amazon plug ON/OFF 1 0
Sengled light bulb ON/OFF 0 1
Intensity 8 56
Hue light bulb ON/OFF 1 1
Nest thermostat Fan ON/OFF 4 58
Ecobee thermostat HVAC Auto/OFF 1 2
Fan ON/Auto 2 4
Rachio sprinkler Quick Run/Stop 84 19
Standby/Active 5 2
Arlo camera Stream ON/OFF 5 34
Roomba robot Clean/Back-to-sta. 4 75
TP-Link plug ON/OFF 0 2
D-Link plug ON/OFF 3 15
D-Link siren ON/OFF 0 1
TP-Link light bulb ON/OFF 11 5
Intensity 2 6
Blossom sprinkler Quick Run/Stop 2 22
Hibernate/Active 3 7
Table 5. Summary of false positives from negative control ex-
periment for Wi-Fi sniffer. The average is less than 19 false pos-
itives per device across a total of 34,723,473 packets from both
datasets.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Conclusion. In this paper, we designed, implemented,
and evaluated PingPong, a tool that automatically ex-
tracts fine-grained information about smart home de-
vice events from encrypted network traffic. This work
advances the state-of-the-art by: (1) identifying simple
packet-level signatures that were not previously known;
(2) using these signatures to infer specific information
about events across a wide range of devices; and (3)
showing that these signatures are effective for both
WAN sniffer and Wi-Fi sniffer attackers. We plan to
make the PingPong tool (software, training datasets
and signatures files) available to the community.
FutureWork. Our study also suggests that the packet-
level signatures we present in this paper can be used to
create a more viable scenario for the MadIoT attack [36],
a type of cyberattack that synchronizes ON/OFF events
of high-wattage devices to cause power-grid failures.
Our preliminary experiments have shown that it is pos-
sible to delay and synchronize ON/OFF events for some
of the high-wattage devices in our set (i.e., the ther-
mostats and smart plugs) by filtering the signature
packets on the router. Other directions for future work
include: analyzing more complex devices (e.g., home as-
sistants) and events generated by smart home appli-
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cations (e.g., motion detection), using PingPong for
real-time matching and anomaly detection, and explor-
ing the robustness of our signatures in the presence of
traffic shaping (e.g., STP) and VPN. Future work in
defenses to PingPong includes exploring techniques for
padding packets to the same length, although they may
not completely eliminate the threat as the number of
packets or their timing may still leak information.
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A Detection
Section 5.2 briefly discussed how PingPong treats a
network trace as a stream of packets and performs sig-
nature detection by presenting each individual packet
to a set of state machines. In this Appendix, we present
additional details for how this is implemented.
For every packet in a sequence, there are two pos-
sible matching strategies: exact and range-based match-
ing. In exact matching, the state machines only con-
sider exactly those packet lengths that were observed
during training (see Section 5.1) as valid. In the range-
based matching strategy, the state machines allow the
packet lengths to lie between the minimum and maxi-
mum packet lengths (plus a small delta) observed dur-
ing training. As such, range-based matching attempts
to accomodate packet sequences that have slight vari-
ations where all permutations may not have been ob-
served during training. For range-based matching, the
lower and upper bounds for each packet of a packet se-
quence are derived from the core points of the packet
pair clustering (see Section 4.1). � is then applied to
these bounds analogous to the clustering technique used
in the DBSCAN algorithm. For example, for � = 10
and core points <C-338, S-541> and <C-339, S-542>,
a state machine that uses range-based matching will
consider client-to-server packets with lengths in [328,
349] as valid, and server-to-client packets with lengths
in [531,552] as valid.
Exact matching is used when no variations in packet
lengths were observed during training, and range-based
matching is used if variations in packet lengths were ob-
served during training. However, range-based matching
is not performed when the signature only consists of 2
packets and/or there is an overlap between the signa-
tures that represent different types of events (e.g., the
D-Link plug’s signatures for ON and OFF in Table 4)
as we observed that range-based matching for 2-packet
signatures generates many false positives for some sig-
natures.
Packet Sequence Matching As explained in Sec-
tion 5.2, a state machine is maintained for each packet
sequence of the signature for each flow, i.e., TCP con-
nection for the WAN sniffer or layer-2 flow for the Wi-
Fi sniffer (see Sec. 3.3). Each packet in the stream of
packets is presented to the state machines associated
with the flow that the packet pertains to. If the packet’s
length and direction matches that of the packet for the
next state, the state machine advances and records the
packet. The detection algorithm operates differently for
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layer-2 and layer-3 detection when the packet does not
match the expected next packet. For layer-2 detection
(Wi-Fi sniffer), the packet is simply ignored, and the
state machine remains in the same state. For layer-3
detection (WAN sniffer), the packet causes the state ma-
chine to discard any partial match as layer-3 detection
need not allow for interleaving packets as it considers
individual TCP connections and can filter out TCP re-
transmissions (see Section 3.3). When a state machine
matches its first packet and advances to the next state,
a new state machine is created for the same packet se-
quence, but in the initial state. This is to ensure that
the state machine starts at the correct first packet, e.g.,
when a packet of that length appears in other traffic.
To bound the number of active state machines, and to
minimize the number of false positives resulting from
retransmissions, any state machine that advances from
state s to state s+1 replaces any existing state machine
in state s+ 1 iff the last packet of the newly advanced
state machine has a later timestamp than that of the ex-
isting state machine. Once a state machine reaches its
terminal state, the set of recorded packets is reported
as a sequence match.
Declaring a Signature Match. A sequence match
does not necessarily mean that the full signature has
been matched. Some signatures are comprised of multi-
ple packet sequences and all of them have to be matched
(e.g., Arlo camera, see Section 4.1). Sequence matches
are therefore reported to a secondary module that ver-
ifies if the required temporal constraints are in place,
namely that the sequence match for packet sequence set
i occurs before the sequence match for packet sequence
set i+1 and that the time between the first packet of the
sequence match corresponding to packet sequence set 1
and the last packet of the sequence match corresponding
to packet sequence set k (for a signature with k packet
sequence sets) is below a threshold (see Appendix B).
B Parameters Selection and
Sensitivity
Clustering Parameters. We empirically examined a
range of values for the parameters of the DBSCAN al-
gorithm. We tried all combinations of � ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10}
and minPts ∈ {30, 31, ..., 50}. We only briefly summarize
the results, due to lack of space. For those devices that
exhibit no variation in their signature related packet
lengths, e.g., the TP-Link plug, the output of the clus-
tering remains stable for all values of � and minPts < 50.
For such devices, keeping � at a minimum and minPts
close to the number of events n reduces the number of
noise points that become part of the resulting clusters.
However, our experiments show that there is a trade-
off in applying strict bounds to devices with more vari-
ation in their packet lengths (e.g., the D-Link plug),
strict bounds can result in losing clusters that contain
packet pairs related to events. For the D-Link plug, this
happens if � < 7 and minPts > 47. In our experiments,
we used our initial values of � = 10 and minPts = 45
(i.e., minPts = �n−0.1n� with n = number of expected
events) from our smart plugs experiment (i.e., the TP-
Link plug, D-Link plug, and SmartThings plug) that
allowed PingPong to produce the packet-level signa-
tures we initially observed manually (see Section 3.2).
We then used them as default parameters for PingPong
to analyze new devices and extracted packet-level sig-
natures from 15 more devices.
Time Window and Signature Duration. We also
measured the duration of our signatures—defined as the
time between the first and the last packets of the sig-
nature. Table 4 reports all the results. The longest sig-
nature duration is 9,132 ms (less than 10 seconds) for
the Sengled light bulb’s ON/OFF signatures from the
Phone-Cloud communication. This justifies our choice
of training time window t = 15 seconds during trace
filtering and signature validation (see Section 4.1). This
conservative choice also provides slack to accommodate
other devices that we have not evaluated and might have
signatures with a longer duration.
Matching. For detection, we use strict time con-
straints. A signature match is declared when all match-
ing packet sequence sets occur within the duration
�t+0.1t� with t being the maximum observed signature
duration (see Table 4).
